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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Aaron Smith was convicted of conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by 
robbery, and interference with interstate commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a), and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  He was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment.   
 Smith appeals two evidentiary decisions made by the District Court during his 
trial: (1) the denial of his motion to suppress a witness identification, and (2) the 
inclusion of testimony about his past infractions at a halfway house where he was 
residing at the time of the robbery.   Although we hold that the identification testimony 
was properly admitted, we conclude that the Court should not have admitted the 
infraction testimony and this error was not harmless.   
I.  Background 
 Around 10:00 a.m. on October 27, 2008, the Fox and Hound restaurant in 
Philadelphia was robbed.  While one robber, a taller, heavier-set man—later identified as 
Omar Hopkins—led restaurant manager Lenny Lowe at gunpoint into a back office to get 
money from the restaurant safe, a second robber took employees Valin Barfield and 
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Tyrone Jenkins, and later delivery person Adam Conley, to the same office and tied them 
with duct tape.  
 Hopkins was arrested shortly after the robbery and cooperated with investigators, 
admitting to the robbery and identifying a third participant who never entered the 
restaurant.  He told police that he had known both co-conspirators for only a week, and 
that he knew them only as ―Snipes‖—later identified as Kareem Watson—and ―A-Dub.‖    
 In 2011, police identified Smith as A-Dub based on a report that Smith went by 
that nickname and in fact had ―A-Dub‖ tattooed on his arm.  FBI Agent Stephen 
McQueen showed two photographs of Smith to Hopkins.  He identified one as A-Dub.  
McQueen also created a photo array containing Smith’s photograph and showed it to 
Lowe, Barfield, and Jenkins.  Only Jenkins was able to identify one of the pictures as the 
second robber, and identified Smith.  Before trial, Smith moved to exclude Jenkins’s 
identification, arguing that the identification of him in the photo array was the result of 
Agent McQueen’s influence and thus unreliable.  The District Court held a hearing at 
which Jenkins and McQueen testified, and the motion was denied. 
 At trial, Jenkins and Hopkins identified Smith as the second robber.  When asked 
if he was ―absolutely certain‖ that Smith was A-Dub, Hopkins responded ―[i]t look like 
him, yes.‖  App. at 465.  On cross-examination, however, Hopkins testified that he 
identified Smith because Smith looked like the pictures he (Hopkins) was shown.  On re-
direct, Hopkins reconfirmed that Smith was A-Dub, yet conceded he was struggling with 
that identification because it had been so long since the robbery.  At trial, Lowe, Barfield, 
and Jenkins described the second robber as somewhere between 5’8‖ and 5’10‖, wearing 
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tan clothing, and having some facial hair, either a goatee or sideburns.  Smith is 5’11‖.  
Hopkins also testified that the three robbers met at a bar on the evening of October 27 to 
celebrate their success.  
 In addition to contesting his involvement in the robbery, Smith presented an alibi 
defense.  At the time of the robbery, he was a resident at a halfway house called Kintock, 
and attended job training at a facility called Connections.  Kintock director Frank Guyon 
testified that, on the day of the robbery, Smith had signed out of Kintock at 7:00 a.m. to 
go to Connections, signed back into Kintock at 4:22 p.m., and did not sign out again that 
day.  Guyon also testified about Kintock’s security, which includes manned entrances and 
barbed wire surrounding the property.  As for the time Smith was signed out of Kintock, 
Gervin Modest, a computer instructor at Connections, testified that he recorded Smith as 
present in the Connections computer lab some time between 9:00 and 11:00 a.m. on the 
morning of the robbery, but did not know how long Smith was at Connections that day.  
Ronnie Dawson, another Connections employee, also testified that attendees were not 
supposed to leave without authorization, and that unauthorized absences were 
occasionally documented, but not always.  Smith did not have authorization to leave 
Connections on the robbery date, nor was any absence noted.  
 Over Smith’s objection, the Government was permitted to elicit testimony from 
Guyon that Smith had been a resident of Kintock from May to October of 2007 and again 
from August 2008 to February 2009, that he was ultimately removed from the facility in 
February of 2009 for failing to return to it, and that he incurred 11 incident reports during 
his time there for failing to follow rules and regulations.  The District Court prevented the 
5 
 
Government from referencing the bases of several infractions—such as Smith’s refusal to 
give a urine sample or to take a breathalyzer test, possession of a pornographic DVD, and 
failure to secure a job—but permitted testimony on other infractions and the total number 
of incidents.  The Government also had Guyon read statements in Smith’s Kintock 
records that he ―was unsuccessfully discharged from the program, due to his inability to 
follow the rules and regulations,‖ ―[a]n assessment of Mr. Smith’s residency shows that 
he maintained a below-average level of compliance with the policies and procedures of 
the program,‖ and ―Mr. Smith’s overall adjustment was poor.‖  Id. at 533–34.  The 
prosecutor also asked Guyon in a leading manner whether ―it’s pretty clear . . . Mr. Smith 
was pretty bad at following the rules at your program?,‖ to which Guyon responded 
―[t]hat’s correct.‖  Id. at 535.  The prosecutor also asked Dawson whether Smith had an 
―accountability problem‖ with Connections, to which Dawson replied that, ―[b]ased on 
the records that I reviewed, yes.‖  Id. at 558.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. 







 A. Identification Testimony 
 Smith first challenges the District Court’s decision to admit Jenkins’s 
identification testimony.  The first question in such a challenge is whether the initial 
identification procedure was unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive.  United States v. 
Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1389 (3d Cir. 1991).  This inquiry considers both the 
suggestiveness of the identification and whether there was good reason to depart from 
less suggestive procedures.  Id.  Only if a procedure was too suggestive need a court ask 
whether it should nonetheless be admitted as reliable under the totality of the 
circumstances.  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).    
 Following a hearing, the District Court concluded that the initial identification 
procedure used with Jenkins was not unnecessarily suggestive.  Smith argues to the 
contrary because Agent McQueen specifically directed Jenkins to concentrate on the 
features of the face that do not change, such as the eyes, nose, and ears.  Smith does not 
explain how McQueen’s instruction could have directed Jenkins to Smith’s photo.  Hence 
the Court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion to suppress Jenkins’s 
identification testimony.     
 B. Infractions Evidence 
 Smith also argues that the District Court erred by allowing testimony about his 
prior bad acts at Kintock and Connections.  Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states that 
―[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character 
in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the 
character,‖ but evidence of a crime or wrong can be admitted ―for another purpose‖ such 
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as ―motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, …[or] absence of mistake.‖  
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)–(2).   
 Rule 404 is a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion, and evidence should be 
admitted unless used merely to show propensity or disposition of the defendant to 
commit the crime.  United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 460 (3d Cir. 2003); United 
States v. Moore, 375 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2004).   The admission of Rule 404(b) 
evidence is evaluated under the Supreme Court’s four-step test: (1) the evidence must 
have a proper purpose under 404(b), (2) it must be relevant, (3) its probative value must 
not be outweighed by its potential for prejudicial effect, and (4) the court must charge the 
jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it is admitted.  
United States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Huddleston v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 681, 691–92 (1988)).  ―A proper purpose is one that is probative of a 
material issue other than character.‖  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 250 (3d Cir. 
2010) (quotation omitted).  Evidence is relevant if it has ―any tendency to make a fact 
[that is of consequence to the determination of the action] more or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.‖  Fed. R. Evid. 401.  The Government must ―clearly 
articulate how that evidence fits into a chain of logical inferences, no link of which can 
be the inference that[,] because the defendant committed offenses before, he therefore is 
more likely to have committed this one.‖  United States v. Morley, 199 F.3d 129, 137 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (quotation and alteration omitted).  Where the defendant failed to request a 
limiting instruction, we review the lack of such an instruction for clear error.  Ansell v. 
Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 526 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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 The Government argues that this evidence was admissible because Smith’s alibi 
rested on an assumption that he followed the attendance rules of Kintock and 
Connections, and evidence of his infractions rebutted that assumption.  We disagree.  
Smith’s alibi was not that he abided by the attendance rules of either facility.  Instead, 
Smith presented the facilities’ own records to show that he was at Connections on the 
morning of the robbery and at Kintock in the evening when the robbers purportedly met 
at a bar.  He produced testimony to show that security features prevented him from 
leaving Kintock without signing out.  He also introduced evidence that he was not 
permitted to leave Connections without authorization, and no documentation existed that 
he was authorized to leave it, or was absent without authorization, on October 27, 2008.   
 The Government could—and did—produce testimony to show that it was possible 
for Smith to leave Kintock or Connections without either facility knowing or 
documenting his absence.  But there is no proper purpose under 404(b) for admission of 
evidence that Smith generally did not abide by the rules of the facilities because his alibi 
was not based on his decision to follow rules, but on records of his presence.  Even the 
infraction most closely related to the possibility that Smith left the facilities without 
authorization—that he absconded from Kintock—occurred months after the robbery and 
could not have been relevant to his motive, intent, or state of mind on the day of the 
robbery.     
 Instead, this testimony commented directly, and negatively, on Smith’s character.  
Although the District Court excluded testimony of the most prejudicial infractions, the 
evidence of other infractions was still relevant only to Smith’s character, precisely the 
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evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits.  The descriptions from Smith’s Kintock file painted a 
picture of Smith as a rule-breaker and person of poor character.  Compounding the error, 
there was no limiting instruction given to the jury; they may have considered this 
character evidence well beyond Smith’s alibi defense in their determination of Smith’s 
guilt.   
 Even if the District Court erred by admitting this evidence of Smith’s bad acts, we 
do not reverse a conviction if it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment of guilt.  United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 131 (3d Cir. 2012).  The 
Government bears the burden of showing harmlessness.  United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 
308, 326 (3d Cir. 2002).  On this record, we cannot conclude that it was highly probable 
the bad acts evidence did not contribute to the judgment of guilt. Evidence connecting 
Smith to the robbery is far from overwhelming.  It included the two identifications, one 
of which was undermined on cross-examination and both of which were made years after 
the robbery; the nickname ―A-Dub,‖ supplied by Hopkins, which Smith has tattooed on 
his arm; and the proximity of Connections to a store Hopkins testified the robbers 
shopped at before the crime.  The bad acts evidence—and the inference that Smith was 
essentially a bad guy—may have contributed to the jury’s determination of Smith’s guilt. 
 In this context, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s error was harmless.  
We thus vacate Smith’s conviction and remand the case.   
